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The geography of innovation is an intriguing topic for economists and 
management scholars as well as corporate decision makers and govern-
ment policymakers. The observation that firms are remarkably concen-
trated in geographic space has inspired a large body of research conducted 
in a variety of industries in management, economics and sociology 
(Krugman 1991; Saxenian 1994; Almeida and Kogut 1999; Sorenson 
and Audia 2000). According to the economic geography literature, firms 
tend to agglomerate to gain better access to pooled skilled labors, shared 
specialized suppliers, inter-firm knowledge spillovers, and greater con-
sumer demands (Marshall 1920; for a recent review, see McCann and 
Folta 2008). Like other economic activities, firms’ knowledge creation 
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and inter-firm knowledge exchanges are significantly clustered in space 
too (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Jaffe et al. 1993; Almeida and Kogut 
1999). Particularly for firm innovations, recent theoretical development 
suggests that the geography of innovation is contingent on social and 
institutional contexts that shape the interaction and knowledge exchange 
of firms (Morgan 1997; Storper 1997; Bell et  al. 2009; Laursen et  al. 
2012). Given the wide variety of institutional contexts across countries, 
how would institutional environments impact the geographical distribu-
tion of firms’ entrepreneurial and innovative activities?
Institutions in a country can be categorized into formal and infor-
mal ones: formal institutions represent structures of codified rules, laws 
or regulations, whereas informal institutions are enduring non-codified, 
socially constructed practices and norms (North 1990; Scott 1995). The 
concomitant consideration of both socio-institutional factors and spa-
tial relationship has the potential to make important conceptual advance 
in our understanding of the innovation dynamics of entrepreneurs and 
firms (Geng et al. 2015; Huang et al. 2015). In this chapter, we explore 
this question: if institutions influence social interactions among entrepre-
neurs and firms both within and across geographical proximity, how does 
the geography of innovative activities vary across different institutional 
environment in different countries? Knowledge creation and innovation 
activities in firms play crucial roles in entrepreneurial activities and it has 
been found that entrepreneurship is influenced by the geographical col-
location of established firms (e.g., Sorenson and Audia 2000). Therefore, 
our analyses focus on innovative activities of firms and we also discuss the 
implications for the geography of entrepreneurship.
 Geographical Proximity, Clusters, 
and Innovations
One important mechanism through which agglomeration or collocation 
produces externalities is by facilitating the transfer of tacit knowledge. 
Knowledge in general is difficult to be confined within its originating 
firms because of its public goods nature (Arrow 1962). Once the knowl-
edge spills over into the public domain, it creates positive externality that 
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benefits other firms (Jaffe 1986). Some knowledge can be tacit and diffi-
cult to articulate or express in codified language (Polanyi 1966). Although 
such knowledge may be transferred through formal channels, such as 
through licensing, alliance, or supply contracts, the efficient transfer of 
tacit knowledge across organizational boundaries generally requires close 
social interaction and face-to-face contact that can be enhanced by geo-
graphical proximity (Marshall 1920). Even with the modern communi-
cation tools like telephones, e-mails, or teleconference that can facilitate 
the transfer of codified knowledge, the acquisition of tacit knowledge still 
rely heavily on face-to-face interactions (Ganesan et al. 2005). As such, 
the resulting knowledge transfer and spillovers are significantly localized 
and clustered in space (Jaffe et al. 1993; Audretsch and Feldman 1996; 
Almeida and Kogut 1999; Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003; Stuart and 
Sorenson 2003; Huang and Ertug 2014).
Since densely clustered regions suggest close geographic proximity 
among collocated firms, scholars often conceptualize clusters as the proxy 
for the effect of vicinity on enhanced knowledge creation (Pouder and 
St. John 1996; Baptista and Swann 1998; Porter 1998; Maskell 2001). 
Clusters help knowledge creation and exchange for individual firms by 
providing a large pool of knowledge workers (Almeida and Kogut 1999; 
Rosenkopf and Almeida 2003), more channels of knowledge transfer 
through social networks (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Whittington 
et  al. 2009), and greater learning opportunities among firms (Arikan 
2009). Extant empirical evidences affirm that the degree of clustering 
positively affects the innovative output of individual firms (Baptista and 
Swann 1998; Beaudry 2001; Whittington et al. 2009; Geng et al. 2015).
 Geography of Innovation and Local and Non- 
Local Social Interactions
When facilitated by inter-firm knowledge exchanges, innovation becomes 
a social and collective process, which requires joint action of clustered 
firms (Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Morgan 1997; Rosenkopf and 
Almeida 2003). Although the proximity of firms in a cluster can enhance 
direct observation and, therefore, the imitation of each other’s inventions 
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even without direct social interactions (Porter 1998; Arikan 2009), the 
transfer and communication of deeper, tacit, and fine-grained informa-
tion require intensive interaction and socialization between firms (Uzzi 
1996; Hansen 1999; Laursen et  al. 2012). Knowledge interaction can 
be impeded in the absence of disciplined social interactions that under-
pin the trust among firms in the clusters (Maskell 2001; Eapen 2012; 
Laursen et al. 2012).
As social interaction intensifies, geographical proximity promotes the 
convergence of idiosyncratic beliefs, assumptions, and values, which can 
evolve collectively into a shared ‘macroculture’ among clustered firms 
(Abrahamson and Fombrun 1994). Social and professional networks 
among individuals and firms emerge within the clusters (Stuart and 
Sorenson 2003). Trust develops among collocated firms with frequent 
interactions (Maskell 2001). The thus developed social norms and rela-
tionships among geographic proximate firms form a kind of ‘geograph-
ically localized social capital’ (Laursen et  al. 2012). They are generally 
accepted as ‘rules of the game’ in the cluster (Pouder and St. John 1996) 
and enhance the ‘untraded interdependence’ among collocated firms, thus 
facilitating inter-firm interactions even in the absence of formal economic 
exchanges (e.g., licensing, alliances) (Storper 1997). Such interdependence 
increases firms’ awareness of the appropriate and effective social relations 
and provides them with cues on how other firms will behave (Bell et al. 
2009). Consequently, the knowledge exchange process is conditional on 
social interactions and embedded in a broader social structure that, in 
turn, guides interactions among firms (Morgan 1997; Storper 1997). For 
example, the success of Silicon Valley is believed to stem from its being 
embedded in a decentralized but cooperative  industrial system with dense 
social networks and a high level of social capital (Saxenian 1994).
Although extant literature has focused on geographically localized social 
interaction, the geography of innovation can also be influenced by the non-
local social interaction that goes beyond geographical vicinity. For example, 
Ganesan et al. (2005) found that the strength of relational ties with knowl-
edge providers is unrelated to the geographic proximity and those rela-
tional ties across geographical distance play significant role in new product 
development. As this topic is still under-explored in the economic geog-
raphy literature, we draw upon the social network literature that provides 
some discussions and empirical evidence on how informal ties between 
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individuals and firms can transcend geographic limits. For instance, in the 
Canadian mutual fund industry, the social networks of managers affect 
firm innovations independent of their spatial distance (Bell 2005). In addi-
tion, more knowledge will flow across geographically distant friendship 
ties than proximate ones, because friends in different locations exposed to 
diverse local milieus have acquired diverse localized knowledge (Bell and 
Zaheer 2007). Nevertheless, these friends with similar backgrounds can 
share the knowledge effectively. Meanwhile, informal ties are more resilient 
to geographic distance than formal ties, and the informal ties between units 
in an organization can mitigate the effect of geographic distance on knowl-
edge transfer (Hansen and Lovas 2004). In addition, Sorenson and Stuart 
(2001) found that previous syndication participation with another venture 
capital firm mitigates the effect of geographic distance on the likelihood of 
venture capital investment on entrepreneurial start-ups. Finally, the influ-
ence of geographical proximity on firm innovation depends on the extent 
to which the firm is also embedded in a global social network comprising 
physically distant partners (Whittington et al. 2009).
In sum, the geography of innovation is contingent on the intensity and 
content of both the local and non-local social interactions. While local 
social interaction can be facilitated by geographical proximity and further 
increases the inter-firm knowledge exchange, the non-local social interac-
tion may mitigate the limitation of geographical proximity on firm inno-
vation. To the extent that the institutional environment influences how 
firms and individuals socially interact among one another, both locally 
and non-locally, the role of geographical proximity in inter-firm knowl-
edge exchange and firm innovation should vary under different insti-
tutional contexts and the embeddedness of firms in such institutional 
contexts. Our next section will further explore this topic.
 Geography of Innovation and Institutional 
Environments
The distinction between formal and informal institutions can be useful 
in investigating the complex relationship between institutional environ-
ments, geographical locations, and firm innovation. Formal institutions 
represent structures of codified or formally accepted rules that are nor-
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mally enforced by laws, whereas informal institutions are enduring but 
unwritten societal norms and conventions (North 1990; Scott 1995). 
Both formal and informal institutions promote social order and sta-
bility by providing shared expectations and routinized guidelines for 
the appropriate behaviors when individuals or firms consider strategic 
choices (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Peng 2003). Compared with infor-
mal institutions, formal institutions are more malleable because they can 
be consciously and purposely designed by human agency (Scott 1995). 
But the effect of formal institutions also depends on the supports or con-
straints of informal institutions that evolve more incrementally (Zucker 
1987). The culturally and socially constructed informal institutions have 
strong binding effects on societal members (North 1990; Scott 1995). 
For example, collectivist beliefs and norms that value adherence to social 
norms and expect goodwill and cooperation among societal members 
have strong binding effects on individuals and firms because societal trust 
and cohesion are rewarded and nonconformity is disciplined (Hofstede 
2001; Holmes et  al. 2013). Moreover, the effect of informal institu-
tions is usually associated with the trust-based informal relationships or 
networks (Zucker 1987). Indeed, recent studies have found that firms 
tend to rely more on social networks and ties to facilitate social interac-
tions and resource exchanges when informal institutions are prevalent 
(Batjargal et al. 2013).
Compared with developed countries, developing countries have long 
been depicted as having weak formal institutions and strong informal 
institutions (Batjargal et al. 2013). In developing countries, the banking 
system, legal protection for private and intellectual property, financial 
disclosure and the judiciary are under-developed or ineffective (Peng and 
Heath 1996; Khanna and Palepu 2000; Huang et al. 2015). Recent lit-
erature also suggested that when formal institutions are weak and inef-
fective, firms tend to rely more on informal institutions (Hitt et al. 2004; 
Webb et al. 2009; Batjargal et al. 2013; Holmes et al. 2013).
For innovative activities that involve tacit knowledge, the interdepen-
dence between formal and informal institutions may have important 
bearings because ‘no amount of legal protection can make a thoroughly 
appropriable commodity of something so intangible as information’ 
(Arrow 1962, p. 615). To understand the relationship between institu-
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tions and geographically constrained social interactions among firms, 
we draw from and build upon the insights from previous literature that 
examines the relationship between institutional environment and gover-
nance of inter-firm relationship (Williamson 1991; Bell et al. 2009; Abdi 
and Aulakh 2012). Under a specific institutional environment, firms can 
develop governance structure that is specific to the inter-firm relationship 
in order to facilitate economic exchange. In the absence of support from 
external formal institutions (e.g., laws regulating and enforcing con-
tracts), formal safeguards (e.g., explicit contracting) become less effective 
(Abdi and Aulakh 2012). Therefore, firms have to rely more on informal 
safeguards based on trust and embeddedness, as well as reputation effects 
(Uzzi 1996; Dyer and Singh 1998). By contrast, reliance on such infor-
mal safeguards can be reduced when formal institutions are developed 
and effective, and provide clear guidance and enforcement.
Under weak formal institutions in developing countries, informal safe-
guards for inter-firm governance based on the localized social norms are 
important for geographically proximate firms, especially when complex 
exchange like knowledge transfer is involved (Dyer and Singh 1998; Bell 
et al. 2009). In particular, the formal institutions that protect knowledge 
creation and exchange are the intellectual property right (IPR) system 
which includes patents or licenses laws. Stronger formal institutions for 
IPR protection increase firms’ incentive to innovate by providing them 
insurance against expropriation (Nordhaus 1969; Teece 1986; Levin et al. 
1987). When the support from formal institutions is ambiguous, weak, 
or absent, firms have to rely more on informal safeguards and informal 
institutions that are shared by the interacting firms. As a result of the 
weak formal (and legal) environment for the protection of IPR, the weak 
formal safeguards for inter-firm knowledge exchange may push firms to 
develop informal safeguards (Pisano 1990; Geng et al. 2015; Huang et al. 
2015), which would allow firms to discipline the inter-firm interactions 
given the potentially pervasive market failures and information asymme-
try in the technology market in which firms can exchange and transact 
on their proprietary knowledge (Arora et al. 2001). As the monitoring of 
inter-firm social interaction and maintaining of trust-based informal safe-
guards are facilitated by spatial proximity (Maskell 2001), the effective-
ness of such informal safeguards is more constrained by the geographical 
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distance. In other words, such informal safeguards are easier to monitor 
and maintain for geographically proximate firms (Laursen et al. 2012). 
Although knowledge can be exchanged between people with modern 
technologies like telephones or e-mails, face-to-face interaction is still 
important for the exchange of tacit knowledge (Ganesan et  al. 2005). 
The importance of informal safeguards and relational ties in knowledge 
acquisition is not mitigated by the modern communication technologies 
(e.g., Ganesan et al. 2005).
As such, we would expect that the proximity effect on geography of 
innovation is more pronounced in developing countries where the infor-
mal institutions are prevalent and heavily relied upon by firms. Put for-
mally, we postulate:
Proposition 1 To the extent that firms’ innovative activities are concen-
trated in clustered regions, geographical proximity has a greater positive 
effect in developing countries than in developed countries on firms’ inno-
vation when they engage in inter-firm knowledge exchange within the 
clusters.
The reliance on informal institutions in developing countries may also 
influence non-local social interactions and subsequently the geography of 
innovation in these countries. Informal institutions and the significance 
of social networks are historically and culturally rooted; thus, they rely less 
on geographical proximity for maintenance. For instance, friends tend to 
still trust each other even in the absence of geographic propinquity (Bell 
2005). Firms within a social network spanning spatial distance are still 
willing to undertake risky cooperative and joint actions without fear of 
opportunism (Uzzi 1996). Therefore, knowledge can still be exchangeable 
for geographically distant firms through such resilient social ties (Bell and 
Zaheer 2007). Indeed, Ganesan et al. (2005) found that the strength of 
relational ties with knowledge providers is not related to geographic prox-
imity. These social ties provide the necessary informal safeguard for inter- 
firm knowledge exchange. Valuable knowledge is much more likely to be 
transmitted through strong relational ties (Frenzen and Nakamoto 1993; 
Rindfleisch and Moorman 2001). As such, those strong ties transcending 
geographic distance can facilitate the knowledge acquisition and innova-
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tion (Ganesan et al. 2005). We therefore expect the social ties across geo-
graphical boundaries to play a bigger role in developing countries with 
strong informal institutions. Therefore, we propose:
Proposition 2 The effect of geographical proximity on firm innovation 
will be less positive for those firms that maintain more non-local social 
ties and interactions. This effect is more pronounced in developing coun-
tries than developed countries.
 The Context of China
To illustrate the theoretical framework, we use the context of China to 
discuss the effect of informal institutions on innovative activities and 
outputs of different types of firms operating in China. Although China 
has undertaken substantial efforts in recent years to improve its insti-
tutional framework (Huang 2010), its formal institutions still remain 
generally weak and inefficient (Fan and Wang 2006). For instance, after 
China joined the World Trade Organization (WTO), to comply with the 
corresponding WTO obligation, China introduced and adopted several 
major institutional reforms to harmonize its institutions with interna-
tional rules. The agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) is one of such efforts and the associated passage 
of the 2001 patent law reform significantly improves upon its current 
judicial protection, reduces the ambiguity in application procedures, and 
strengthens the enforcement and protection of IPR (Hu and Mathews 
2008). Nevertheless, the development of formal institutions in China is 
still weak compared to the developed countries (Huang 2016).
Given its weak formal institutions, the informal institutions in China 
that have been shaped by the long Chinese history and deep-rooted cul-
tural tradition still have profound influence on Chinese business activi-
ties. The strong collectivistic culture of the Chinese people (Hofstede 
2001) tends to emphasize networked relationships and in-groups (Xiao 
and Tsui 2007). For example, guanxi is a Chinese-style social network 
that has been used widely in the Chinese business community to obtain 
market information, scarce resources, and protection (Xin and Pearce 
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1996). Furthermore, Chinese people tend to form in-groups based on 
such characteristics as kinship, hometown, common schooling, or work 
experience (Yang 1994). These in-groups are usually permanent groups 
with inner or more intimate networks, in which resources flow easily. 
Both guanxi and in-groups, among other cultural and normative aspects, 
point to the long-lasting Chinese informal institutions that emphasize 
the importance of trust, obligation, and reciprocity in Chinese social 
interactions. These informal institutions are exceedingly enduring and 
can function both within and beyond geographical boundaries.
To deepen our understanding on the effect of informal institutions, 
we discuss the difference in innovative activities between multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) from developed countries and domestic Chinese 
firms located in different regions of China. To the extent that MNEs 
operating in China have less access to informal institutions and norms 
for knowledge exchange than Chinese firms, we should observe the dif-
ferential impact of informal institutions on their innovations activities 
(Huang et al. 2015; Huang 2016).
In general, MNEs have considerable technological advantages com-
pared with their domestic Chinese counterparts and they often transfer 
advanced knowledge into the domestic region in China where they oper-
ate and conduct research and development (R&D). However, there is an 
increasing need for MNEs to tap into the local knowledge of their host 
countries in order to develop context-relevant innovations and products 
(Govindarajan and Ramamurti 2011). Although the modern communi-
cation technologies like teleconference and e-mails can increase the effi-
ciency of communication, they alone cannot help these companies to 
achieve the goal of acquiring tacit knowledge in the local market. This 
situation is demonstrated by the increasing number of R&D centers 
established in China by MNEs (Zhao 2006). Previous studies have also 
found that there are both significant inflow and outflow of knowledge 
between MNEs and host countries (Singh 2007), and that the knowl-
edge structure of host countries has significant positive impact on MNEs’ 
innovation (Almeida and Phene 2004).
In the process of gaining access to local knowledge, MNEs often rely 
less on informal institutions than domestic Chinese firms. The atti-
tudes, beliefs, and values of managers in MNEs are strongly influenced 
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by the culture in their home countries despite their culturally diverse 
working environments (Hofstede 2001). MNEs from developed coun-
tries are generally more responsive to formal IPR protection because 
they traditionally attach greater importance to formal rules and regula-
tions in their home countries (Grossman and Helpman 1991; Khoury 
et  al. 2014). Their well-developed home institutional environments 
usually have clearly stipulated rules and effective enforcement, which 
reduce their need to rely on informal institutions to protect their intel-
lectual assets from infringement. As MNEs have developed their orga-
nizational routines to suit the developed institutional environment of 
their home countries, these routines can constrain them from effec-
tively adapting to the complex and sometimes ambiguous institutional 
environments in the host countries (Kostova and Zaheer 1999). It is 
often very difficult and time-consuming for foreign firms to adapt to 
Chinese informal institutions or break into the Chinese domestic social 
networks (Luo 2007).
In comparison with Chinese firms, the lack of access to the Chinese 
informal institutions and associated social networks makes geographi-
cal proximity not critically helpful for MNEs to effectively tap the local 
knowledge of proximate firms in a cluster (Geng et al. 2015). Therefore, 
we postulate:
Proposition 3 The effect of geographical proximity on firm innovation is 
stronger for domestic Chinese firms than for MNEs in China.
Furthermore, domestic Chinese firms are more likely to engage in 
knowledge exchange with distant firms through their maintained social 
networks which are not easily available for foreign MNEs. Therefore, for 
those MNEs located far apart from other firms, in order to develop con-
text relevance and innovations suitable for local usage, they can primarily 
only tap into geographically localized knowledge in the immediate region 
in which they are located. Therefore, we suggest:
Proposition 4 MNEs are more disadvantaged than domestic Chinese 
firms in acquiring external knowledge in the host country (China) if they 
are located in less clustered regions in China.
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 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we integrate institutional theory and economic geography 
to explain f irms’ innovative activities in the context of China. Although 
these two disciplines appear to have been largely developed indepen-
dently, there exists synergy between them in that both emphasize the 
role of social interactions. Economic geographers focus on the concept 
of spatial proximity and suggest that social interactions are more likely to 
take place within the vicinity (Storper 1997; Maskell 2001). Meanwhile, 
institutional theorists argue that social interactions are guided and shaped 
by institutions that provide the rules and norms (North 1990; Scott 
1995). The integrative perspective derived from these two disciplines can 
help deepen our understanding of the effect of spatial proximity on firm 
behavior. This chapter postulates that the influence of geographical prox-
imity on inter-firm knowledge exchange depends on formal and informal 
institutions that underpin the social interactions both within and across 
geographical boundaries.
This chapter also provides a new perspective on the constraining and 
enabling function of geographical proximity in relation to economic and 
entrepreneurial activities, although this relationship is probably more 
salient in the case of China with its strong influence of informal insti-
tutions. On the one hand, although economic activities are generally 
territorially constrained, non-local social interactions may help firms to 
overcome such limitation. This might be especially important for new 
start-ups which may be more resource constrained and vulnerable to the 
localized competition. However, these entrepreneurs probably can take 
advantage of their relational ties with their prior friends or employees 
(e.g., Sorenson and Audia 2000). On the other hand, collocating with 
other firms does not guarantee that firms derive the full benefit from 
agglomeration. Localized social interaction sometimes can play a more 
important role than that played by geographical distance. Consequently, 
firms, especially start-up firms, need to take into account of the social 
structure when they make locational decisions. Moreover, some stud-
ies have suggested that firms with superior knowledge tend to stay away 
from clustered regions due to the concern for potential knowledge leak-
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age to rival firms (Shaver and Flyer 2000; Alcácer and Chung 2007). 
The theoretical framework outlined in this chapter provides yet another 
motivation for these firms to behave in this way because they may be able 
to rely on social ties that are less constrained by geographical proximity 
to acquire the external knowledge.
In summary, this chapter sheds light on the social and institutional 
mechanisms underpinning the knowledge exchange processes and 
regional innovation. Although we used the case of China for illustration, 
our theoretical framework has the potential to serve as a starting point to 
advance our methodology in future empirical studies, particularly in the 
context of other developing countries. Our discussion shows that inte-
grating an institutional perspective in understanding the geography of 
innovation is a promising agenda for future research on firm innovations 
in emerging economies.
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